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Abstract
Since the launch of the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) in 1988 the global incidence of poliomyelitis has
fallen by nearly 99 %. From a situation where wild type poliovirus was endemic in 125 countries across five
continents, transmission is now limited to regions of just three countries – Pakistan, Afghanistan and Nigeria. A
sharp increase in Pakistan’s poliomyelitis cases in 2014 prompted the International Health Regulations Emergency
Committee to declare the situation a ‘public health emergency of international concern’. Global polio eradication
hinges on Pakistan’s ability to address the religious, political and socioeconomic barriers to immunisation; including
discrepancies in vaccine coverage, a poor health infrastructure, and conflict in polio-endemic regions of the
country. This analysis provides an overview of the GPEI, focusing on the historical and contemporary challenges
facing Pakistan’s polio eradication programme and the impact of conflict and insecurity, and sheds light on
strategies to combat vaccine hesitancy, engage local communities and build on recent progress towards polio
eradication in Pakistan.
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Background
Before the launch of the Global Polio Eradication Initia-
tive (GPEI) in 1988, poliomyelitis paralysed and killed
hundreds of thousands of people every year [1]. Polio is
highly infectious, consisting of serotypes 1, 2, and 3.
Horizontal transmission usually occurs via the faeco-oral
and oral-oral routes, with faeco-oral transmission con-
tributing to the majority of cases especially in regions
with poor hygiene and sanitation [2, 3]. The develop-
ment of the inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) in 1955,
led to a sharp reduction in viral transmission and cases
in the USA from approximately 20,000 cases per year in
the 1950s to less than 1000 cases by the 1960s [4].
However, the live-attenuated oral poliovirus vaccine
(OPV) developed in 1963 remains the major vaccine in
the developing world due to its cost-effectiveness, easy
oral administration and comparatively better induction
of intestinal immunity compared to the IPV [5].
The use of these vaccines rapidly interrupted the indi-
genous transmission of wild poliovirus in the Americas
by the early 1980s and led to the launch of the GPEI
with a resolution of the World Health Assembly (WHA)
in 1988 [6]. The GPEI has made extraordinary progress
since 1988; from a situation where wild poliovirus was
endemic in 125 countries across five continents, paralys-
ing 350,000 children every year, to reducing global an-
nual incidence by more than 99 % [1]. In addition, wild
type 2 poliovirus was successfully eradicated in 1999 and
the last case of wild type 3 poliovirus was reported in
November 2012 [5, 7]. In 2015, four of the six WHO
regions were certified as polio-free, leaving Pakistan
and Afghanistan as the remaining endemic reservoirs
of wild poliovirus [8]. Illiteracy, religious misconcep-
tions, conflict and insecurity in these regions have
seriously hampered vaccination efforts and have been
directly associated with a rise in wild poliovirus trans-
mission with the potential to unravel the progress
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made by the GPEI [9]. These fears were realised fol-
lowing an outbreak of 36 cases of polio in Syria and
the isolation of wild poliovirus type 1, traced to
Pakistan, from sewage samples in Israel towards the
end of 2013 [10, 11]. The successful eradication of
wild poliovirus therefore rests on Pakistan’s immun-
isation programme and strategy.
This review focuses on Pakistan’s polio eradication
campaign in the context of its current security environ-
ment. It aims to highlight (1) the historical challenges
faced by the GPEI (2) obstacles faced by Pakistan in its
polio eradication campaign and (3) lessons and solutions
learned from the campaign in a conflict health
environment.
The Global Polio Eradication Initiative
The GPEI is a multinational partnership between the
World Health Organization (WHO), the United States
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), The
United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF),
Rotary International and national governments. Polio-
affected countries undertake all eradication activities
with major strategic planning, coordination and data
collection carried out by the WHO [6].
Despite the launch of the GPEI in 1988, most endemic
countries only began polio eradication programmes in
the mid-1990s, with the last two countries, the
Democratic Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone only
starting national polio eradication campaigns in 2000
due to civil conflict, the initial target for global polio
eradication [6]. The GPEI has therefore had to operate
in a complex and ever-changing geopolitical landscape
and contend with many factors particularly the impact
of conflict.
However, it would be wrong to assume that conflict
alone has been the main barrier. In many cases, polio-
endemic countries have faced numerous additional
challenges culminating in insufficient population im-
munity to halt viral transmission. The implementation
of Supplementary Immunisation Activities (SIAs) has
been a cornerstone of the GPEI’s strategy to suffi-
ciently raise population immunity and halt transmis-
sion. This strategy has been difficult to implement in
some regions due to geographical limitations, such as
in the Kosi river basin in Bihar, India. Poor manage-
ment and health communication strategies have also
been a hindrance, as documented in Northern Nigeria
and Pakistan, where provincial and district health
agencies, which controlled most vaccination resources,
were not sufficiently engaged nor were religious and
community leaders advocated to support the campaign
[6]. Misinformation and suspicion regarding the OPV
campaign in some communities have also been a sig-
nificant barrier to achieving the GPEI’s goals. These
concerns include misconceptions regarding the efficacy
of the OPV in local communities and among vaccina-
tors engaged in repeat SIAs. A widespread belief docu-
mented in Nigeria, India, Pakistan and elsewhere that
the OPV causes infertility as well as cultural barriers such
as the deployment of all-male vaccinator teams in conser-
vative regions have also been highlighted [12].
As the global incidence of wild poliovirus falls, the
widespread use of the live-attenuated OPV in developing
countries has been associated with reversion of live-
attenuated virus to virulent form, a circulating vaccine-
derived poliovirus (cVDPV) [13]. Traditionally, out-
breaks of cVDPVs and vaccine-associated paralytic polio-
myelitis (VAPPs) have been controlled with increased
surveillance and SIAs using OPVs, with IPV use re-
stricted in regions prone to faecal-oral spread. The risk
of accidentally releasing wild poliovirus from IPV pro-
duction facilities, as was the case in The Netherlands
(1992) and Belgium (2014), has resulted in limiting pro-
duction to a few industrialised countries where the con-
sequences of releasing poliovirus into a crowded region
with poor sanitation is diminished [14]. Insecure,
conflict-affected countries have a particular risk profile
in this regard. However, the current prevalence of VAPP
and cVDPVs requires the phased withdrawal of all OPVs
if all sources of poliomyelitis are to be eliminated. This
is reflected in the 2013–2018 Polio Eradication and End-
game Strategic Plan, which calls for the synchronised re-
placement of tri- and bivalent OPV by April 2016 upon
the introduction of IPV in routine immunisation across
countries [15, 16].
Impact of conflict on the GPEI in Pakistan
Pakistan’s polio eradication campaign
Pakistan’s polio eradication programme has come under
international scrutiny due to its position as the main
driver of global wild poliovirus spread in recent years.
This is rooted in financial and organisational deficits, as
well as active conflict and insecurity, which has resulted
in the persistent failure of effective immunisation cam-
paigns and SIAs to reach all areas of the country.
Pakistan is divided into four provinces (Sindh, Punjab,
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa [KP] and Balochistan), the
Islamabad Capital Area, the Federally Administered
Tribal Areas (FATA) and two administrative areas
(Gilgit-Baltistan and Azad Jammu and Kashmir) [17]. It
is the most populous country in the WHO’s Eastern
Mediterranean Region and one of the least developed,
with a large population of approximately 188.9 million
people including 24.7 million children under 5 years old
and 66.2 million children under 15 years old, making it
critical to polio eradication efforts [17, 18].
Pakistan’s Expanded Programme on Immunisations
(EPI) was formally initiated in 1978 after the WHO
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launched its Expanded Programme on Immunisation in
1974 [19, 20]. National EPI policy is regulated by the
guidance of the National Immunisation Technical Advis-
ory Group (NITAG), which makes evidence-based rec-
ommendations to improve the programme [19]. The
immunisation programme is delivered with the assist-
ance of 10,000 vaccinators, 6000 Lady Health Visitors
and other paramedical staff. In addition, over 100,000
Lady Health Workers support the programme through
social mobilisation efforts, tracing vaccine defaulters and
occasionally administering vaccines. There are approxi-
mately 6000 fixed EPI centres but their variable geo-
graphic distribution at district and sub-district levels
make national immunisation drives and SIAs the main-
stay of polio eradication efforts [21]. The polio eradica-
tion effort in Pakistan is also funded and supported by a
number of international organisations including the
WHO, UNICEF, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation
and the Global Alliance for Vaccinations and Immunisa-
tions (GAVI) [19].
Immunisation and surveillance strategies
Routine immunisation against poliovirus and five other
diseases was initiated in 1978 with the launch of the na-
tional EPI. However, SIAs specifically targeting polio
began in 1994 in line with the GPEI, with the strategy
evolving over the past two decades to intensify cam-
paigns during seasons when the risk of viral transmis-
sion was high, and SIAs in border regions were
coordinated to coincide with SIAs in neighbouring Iran
and Afghanistan for maximum coverage [22].
From 2000 onwards, the campaign strategy incorporated
house-to-house visits with at least 7 rounds of national
immunisation days and targeted ‘mop-up’ SIAs during ne-
gotiated ceasefires in conflict regions, based on local sur-
veillance results or in response to disease outbreaks. OPV
type has also changed over time to reflect changing WHO
recommendations and innovations in vaccine composition
with trivalent OPVs were used exclusively in SIAs from
1994 to 2004, the introduction of monovalent OPV types 1
and 3 in 2005 and 2007 led to their use in combination
with trivalent OPVs in SIAs from 2005 to 2010. Monova-
lent OPVs were replaced with the introduction of the bi-
valent OPV in 2010 for subsequent campaigns [17].
National surveillance of acute flaccid paralysis (AFP)
was also initiated in conjunction with vaccine delivery in
1994 although the necessary infrastructure and training
programmes only became functional in 1998. In addition
to adopting AFP diagnostic criteria in the field, the
National Institutes of Health in Islamabad serves as the
WHO-accredited national poliovirus laboratory where
stool and sewage samples are analysed to monitor the
efficacy and sensitivity of AFP surveillance and provide
genetic data on circulating poliovirus lineages [23].
Barriers towards polio eradication in Pakistan
There is a strong correlation between low immunisation
completion and negative socioeconomic factors, in
addition to conflict, such as illiteracy, poverty and diffi-
culty accessing community health and immunisation ser-
vices [19]. Pakistan faces all of these challenges coupled
with a difficult geography, from the Himalayan moun-
tain range and glaciers of the north to the harsh terrain
of Balochistan in the south, contributing to poor public
health delivery. Vast differences in the country’s popula-
tion density also present challenges to the polio eradica-
tion campaign; with densely populated cities such as
Lahore and Karachi presenting the risk of rapid faecal-
oral spread juxtaposed with the sparsely populated and
heavily mountainous Balochistan province [24].
Poor management and operational deficits
With less than 2 % of the Gross National Product (GNP)
spent on healthcare, an adequate health infrastructure
and service delivery system is severely lacking in many
parts of the country. Although the GPEI’s Pakistan
operation is relatively well-financed, its efficiency is
compromised by a lack of transparency in governance,
an under-resourced public health delivery service and a
poorly regulated private health sector [25].
Closser [26] notes that with more pressing national
problems such as frequent power outages, the lack of
running water in many areas, the loss of agricultural
output and food supply from natural disasters and active
insurgencies in Balochistan, KP and FATA; health initia-
tives such as implementing the GPEI have had a lower
priority especially compared to the resource demands of
combating more prevalent infectious diseases. This is
compounded by poor management and allocation of
finances at the regional/district level, leading to ineffi-
ciencies in vaccine delivery and a pervasive lack of
accountability in meeting immunisation targets [19].
There are also significant inequities in immunisation
coverage and resource availability at the provincial and
district levels, with conflict and insecurity affecting ac-
cess in some regions; immunisation coverage varied
from more than 75 % in Punjab to less than 45 % in
FATA and Balochistan [27]. This extends to large urban
centres such as Karachi, where low-income neighbour-
hoods had significantly lower coverage compared to
more affluent areas of the city [19]. Furthermore, the
central government’s influence in regulating and imple-
menting the polio eradication campaign is highly vari-
able with reports of district health officials resisting
directives from superiors through false compliance, re-
fusing to work or direct confrontation, with one report
suggesting that vaccinator teams had a 31 % higher
chance of not visiting a target area than the baseline vac-
cine refusal rate [28]. Some EPI centres are also reported
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to lack vaccination registration records or computerised
immunisation registries, and with the last census con-
ducted 16 years ago, these present significant hurdles in
estimating the number of children needing vaccination
[19]. Vaccinator satisfaction has also been negatively af-
fected by systemic flaws in the EPI including the lack of
financial incentives, low salaries and delays in payment
[29]. These factors have all led to an environment where
institutionalised malpractice is commonplace, with in-
spectors appointed on political grounds rather than ex-
perience, and the active pilfering of resources from the
state [25, 28].
Concerns regarding OPV efficacy
OPV use correlates with the incidence of cVDPVs and
VAPPs especially in regions prone to enteric infections
such as Pakistan. Frequent power outages and the scar-
city of equipment in Pakistan have made it difficult to
maintain the cold chain necessary for OPV efficacy, and
has contributed to the alarming rise of cVDPVs as well
as wild poliovirus-induced poliomyelitis among vacci-
nated children [27, 30].
Vaccine hesitancy
Pakistan’s basic adult literacy rate is approximately 60 %
with higher rates in urban centres than rural areas, where
two-thirds of the population live [19, 28]. Illiteracy, socio-
economic, cultural and religious factors have all contrib-
uted to vaccine hesitancy in Pakistan. Parental refusal is a
significant hindrance to the vaccination campaign due to
misconceptions regarding the purpose or effectiveness of
immunisation such as the widespread misconception that
vaccines can harm or sterilise children, or contain mon-
key- or pig-derived products which is forbidden in Islam.
The repeated administration of the OPV was also cited as
a barrier; with some parents suspecting that this was to
ensure that their children were sterilised, or that substand-
ard vaccines were being used [31].
Cultural issues such as the presence of all-male vaccin-
ator teams when the mother is alone, or when family or
community elders have not given consent for vaccin-
ation have also been cited as important barriers to im-
munisation in some communities [19]. A basic lack of
awareness of the symptoms and effects of polio in target
populations is also to blame for vaccine refusal, leading
to damaging rumours including the misbelief that polio-
associated paralysis is curable [9]. However, the persist-
ence of poliomyelitis in KP and FATA, the major wild
poliovirus reservoirs in Pakistan, is intimately linked to
active conflict and insecurity in these regions.
Conflict, militancy and the polio eradication campaign
Despite the multitude of challenges facing Pakistan’s
polio eradication campaign, the annual number of polio
cases has declined by more than 90 % since 1994. The
strategy of combining routine immunisation and SIAs
led to a significant reduction of cases between 1998 and
2005, however poliomyelitis cases began to increase
from 2006 as the Taliban insurgency intensified in KP
and FATA, leading to the displacement of millions of
people and inward migration to major urban centres
such as Karachi [17, 30].
Conflict and insecurity in KP and FATA led to a dra-
matic rise of reported paralytic polio cases in Pakistan,
from 91 cases in 2013 to more than 300 in 2014, repre-
senting more than 85 % of the global wild poliovirus
caseload. In response, the International Health Regula-
tions Emergency Committee declared the situation a
public health emergency of international concern in
2014, even considering an international travel ban to
reduce the risk of wild poliovirus spreading to polio-free
countries [14, 30, 32]. Recent outbreaks of poliomyelitis
in central Asia, central Africa and the Middle East,
which were traced to either Pakistan or Nigeria, under-
scores the importance of continuing the polio eradica-
tion effort in these regions [9, 14]. The following
sections explore how conflict and militancy have affected
Pakistan’s polio eradication campaign in greater depth.
Negative propaganda against vaccination
A concerted propaganda campaign by militants operat-
ing from the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region, and
supported by some religious clerics, has spun a narrative
linking vaccination programmes to a Western plot to
sterilise Muslims and painted vaccinators as spies for the
US Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) highly unpopular
drone programme; especially after revelations that the
CIA funded a fake hepatitis B vaccination campaign in
Abbottabad to trace Osama bin Laden [28, 30, 33]. This
has led to a deep suspicion of the polio eradication cam-
paign, especially in rural FATA and KP, which have the
highest vaccine refusal rates and present with the most
poliomyelitis cases [9, 17]. Vaccinators operating in
conflict-affected parts of FATA and KP report significant
hostility, partly because they are perceived to be follow-
ing a Western agenda [31, 34]. Survey data from FATA
showed that only 25 % of residents trusted vaccinators
compared to 61 % in low-conflict areas, highlighting
how pervasive this narrative has become [9].
There is some evidence that attitudes and perceptions
towards polio vaccination are shifting, with recent cross-
sectional studies suggesting that the majority of the pub-
lic in a sample from Punjab support the immunisation
programme, although some reticence does remain on
religious grounds [35]. This contrasts with findings from
a cross-sectional study of residents of Quetta and
Peshawar, both highly affected regions, where false reli-
gious beliefs, fears of vaccine-induced infertility and
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security issues were identified as major barriers towards
acceptance [36].
Vaccination bans and security concerns
The Taliban-imposed ban on vaccination in 2012 has
been detrimental to polio eradication efforts, especially
in parts of FATA where more than 350,000 children
remained unvaccinated for more than 2 years [17]. Tar-
geted attacks against immunisation teams since 2012
have tragically killed scores of vaccinators, curtailing the
implementation of SIAs and house-to-house visits and
the cancellation of post-SIA surveys and quality assess-
ment in high-risk areas [37, 38]. The prevailing strategy
in these areas has had to shift due to security concerns;
limited SIAs are now only carried out under armed es-
cort in one day without giving residents prior notice
[17]. This climate of fear and insecurity has also im-
pacted the recruitment, training and retention of vacci-
nators; with FATA and KP-based teams now facing a
significant shortage of trained staff [27].
Fighting between Pakistan’s military and insurgents
operating from polio-endemic regions has resulted in
the internal displacement of millions of people, and with
it, the spread of wild poliovirus to other parts of
Pakistan and other countries. AFP and environmental
surveillance data indicate that current wild poliovirus
transmission originates from these regions in FATA and
KP, with a significantly higher prevalence among intern-
ally displaced persons (IDPs) settled elsewhere in the
country [17, 27].
Recent progress towards polio eradication
In 2015, territorial gains made by the Pakistani military
in FATA, gave more access to vaccinator teams in
regions where they were banned [28]. The KP provincial
government also initiated the ‘Alliance for Health’
programme in February 2015 to improve security for vac-
cination teams and increase community engagement ef-
forts in FATA [39]. Collaborations between Pakistan’s
security forces and the polio eradication campaign have
helped achieve a reduction of over 80 % in new polio cases
reported in 2015 [40] compared to 2014 (306) [41, 42].
Strategies to improve the polio eradication campaign
Pakistan’s National Emergency Action Plan for Polio
Eradication (NEAP) 2015–2016 reported that deficits in
the quality and coverage of the polio eradication cam-
paign including suboptimal AFP surveillance, delayed
payments to staff, poor accountability and management
practices and the widespread disruption of SIAs in
polio-endemic regions due to attacks on vaccination
teams and their security escorts led to a large number of
children, more than 80 % of them under 2 years old,
remaining unvaccinated in 2014 [43].
The NEAP outlines steps taken by Pakistan’s govern-
ment to improve polio vaccination outcomes including
overhauling the polio eradication campaign’s manage-
ment structure to increase accountability and transpar-
ency and improve vaccinator training, recruitment and
retention. It also highlights efforts to address low vaccin-
ator morale by offering more guidance and support to
frontline staff, improving the current payment mechanism,
reducing staff turnover rates and establishing minimum
performance benchmarks at the Union Council level. Im-
proving existing security protocols for vaccinator teams
during and prior to immunisation campaigns in coordin-
ation with military and law enforcement agencies has also
been identified as a key priority in high-risk areas [43].
Strengthening Pakistan’s health infrastructure
Investing in Pakistan’s EPI programme is critical to
achieving polio eradication in the country. In addition to
misconceptions and concerns regarding vaccination, one
of the main reasons for refusal has been the lack of
access to EPI centres [19, 44, 45]. Increasing the number
of fixed EPI centres, especially in rural areas, is crucial
to effective service delivery in hard-to-reach regions of
the country. Pakistan’s 100,000 female health workers
and military personnel operating in high-risk areas can
also be trained to administer vaccines that can help miti-
gate the current shortage of vaccinators [19, 46]. Ac-
countability and institutionalised malpractice have also
been cited as major issues facing the EPI programme,
and steps must be taken to ensure that district health of-
ficials are adequately trained and evaluated to ensure
sufficient vaccine coverage in a given district.
Owais and colleagues [19] also note that despite EPI
centres being hosted in Basic Health Units (BHU), there
is a lack of integration between vaccination and curative
health services. Furthermore, there are also discrepancies
in immunisation coverage for the more prominent polio
eradication campaign and campaigns against other infec-
tious diseases such as measles, diphtheria, pertussis and
tetanus (DPT); in fact, children are more likely to be
vaccinated against polio than DPT or measles [1]. Inte-
gration between these arms of Pakistan’s health services
and their delivery as an inclusive package can be a more
effective way to engage communities and religious
leaders than a narrow, polio-specific agenda [46].
Community engagement and education
The fallout from the CIA’s fake hepatitis B vaccination
campaign in 2011, and the politicisation of vaccination
campaigns has made the creation of ‘days of tranquillity’,
ceasefires brokered in previous conflict zones for vac-
cine delivery, a distant possibility [46, 47]. Visible
partnerships between political and religious authority
figures have been instrumental in Nigeria's polio
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eradication campaign [48]. Ending the 2003 polio im-
munisation boycott in Northern Nigeria required inten-
sive diplomacy; the United Nations (UN) sent a special
envoy to negotiate ending the polio boycott with key re-
ligious and political leaders, and the GPEI worked with
the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) to ad-
dress concerns regarding the aims of the polio eradica-
tion campaign, as well as the safety and efficacy of the
polio vaccine. Saudi Arabia’s enforcement of WHO rec-
ommendations with fatwas (formal Islamic rulings) to
vaccinate pilgrims undertaking the Hajj in 2005 also
helped dispel suspicions that the polio eradication cam-
paign aims to sterilise Muslims [49]. This strategy has
also been applied in Pakistan where prominent Islamic
scholars issued a fatwa endorsing the polio vaccination
campaign [50]; and have also led door-to-door cam-
paigns in parts of the country [36].
The health communication strategy in India and
Nigeria incorporated sustained media campaigns, the
support of influential public and religious leaders and
efforts to overcome social barriers to provide vaccine
coverage to vulnerable and hard-to-reach populations,
which has translated to a situation where these countries
are now polio-free [5, 12]. Gaining support from influen-
tial public figures and the use of mass communication
strategies for health awareness and social mobilisation
can help shift negative perceptions of the polio vaccine
campaign, and reduce vaccine refusal rates. Efforts to
improve health communication in Pakistan are under-
way. UNICEF, for instance, has partnered with imams to
facilitate immunisation in thousands of schools and
madrassas across the country, and launched media cam-
paigns to highlight the risks of polio and the importance
of vaccination [51]. However, Pakistan’s government has
also taken the controversial step of arresting parents who
refuse to vaccinate their children; however, the utility of
this approach in combating the negative narratives around
vaccination are seriously open to question [30, 52, 53].
Pakistan’s Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), many of
which provide community health services in regions with-
out a public health infrastructure, can also be recruited to
support campaign efforts. Many of these CSOs have
already built strong partnerships with the communities
they serve, are privy to local concerns and have the logis-
tics to facilitate the immunisation campaign and associ-
ated health initiatives [19].
Prioritising vaccination in polio-endemic regions
Pakistan’s NEAP includes an SIA prioritisation
framework which classifies districts across the coun-
try into four tiers based on the incidence of polio-
myelitis. It identifies 12 districts including Karachi,
Quetta, parts of FATA and KP as polio-endemic
‘Reservoir Districts’ and 30 ‘High Risk Districts’
mainly in southern FATA and KP, which are sched-
uled to receive intensified SIA campaigns. In
addition, 11 ‘Outbreak Districts’ have been added to
the Sub-National Immunisation Day calendar. Low-
risk districts covering the rest of Pakistan will follow
the National Immunisation Day calendar. Mobile
populations including IDPs are to be vaccinated at
Permanent Transit Points (PTPs) in districts bordering
KP and FATA, and at the border with Afghanistan; a cru-
cial step in stemming the spread of polio to other parts of
the country [43]. By coordinating these efforts to improve
the polio eradication campaign with military offensives in
FATA and KP, it is hoped that a significant reduction in
poliomyelitis cases can be achieved by the end of 2016.
Global health, diplomacy and foreign policy
One of the major lessons from the conflict and health
interface in Pakistan is how security and health agendas
can both fail and support each other. The clandestine
use of a fake vaccination campaign in the search for
Osama bin Laden significantly damaged the credibility
of the GPEI and other vaccination programmes in
Pakistan [33]. This is not an isolated incident, and sev-
eral countries are alleged to have used aid workers for
intelligence purposes [54]. The covert use of health ini-
tiatives to advance ulterior security or foreign policy mo-
tives inevitably undermines the safety of healthcare
personnel, increases suspicion and hostility to such pro-
grammes among recipient countries, jeopardising their
legitimate long-term global health goals [33, 40, 55].
Global health initiatives are becoming increasingly inter-
twined with the diplomatic, foreign policy and security in-
terests of both donor and recipient countries and there are
calls for greater cooperation between global health profes-
sionals and foreign policymakers to address this paradigm
shift [40, 55]. Kaufmann and Feldbaum [49] detail how an
integrated, nuanced approach towards the religious and
political issues underlying the Northern Nigerian polio im-
munisation boycott helped resolve the crisis. Influential Is-
lamic countries such as Saudi Arabia, which has extensive
experience in implementing public health measures using
formal religious authority, and international bodies such as
the OIC and the International Fatwa Body can bolster
Pakistan’s efforts in combating the religious issues under-
lying vaccine hesitancy in Pakistan [56].
More widely, global health programmes cannot iso-
late themselves from local and international eco-
nomic, security and political interests. The USA, UK
and European Union have all incorporated aid and
‘smart global health’ as an instrument of foreign pol-
icy, so too have emerging powers such as China,
Brazil and Cuba [57]. However, the design and
delivery of many of these programmes have failed to
mitigate how they impact traditional social and
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religious norms, antagonising the recipient population
and potentially undermining any health benefits. In
the Pakistani context, formal liaisons do exist between
the GPEI and the Pakistani government. The Paki-
stani military for instance has worked with vaccin-
ation teams to immunise IDPs fleeing conflict regions
in FATA, and the immunisation schedule has been in-
tensified for the 2015–16 period to target vulnerable
populations; a good example of how security and
health interests can align [43].
An important lesson from Pakistan’s case is how the
exclusive use of health outcomes failed to realise the
collateral and indirect effects on local cultural and reli-
gious sensibilities [58]. The NEAP outlines efforts to ad-
dress these concerns, including support from media
organisations and community outreach programmes to
improve vaccine education among recipients [43]. How-
ever, addressing the long-term health inequalities in
Pakistan (as argued elsewhere in this article) will require
an overhaul of the health bureaucracy as well as improve
access to health in hard-to-reach areas. Global health
initiatives have the potential to facilitate these changes
by aligning their primary health goals with local health
priorities; partnering with CSOs and other organisa-
tions aimed at more general social welfare. Indeed
Kevany [57, 58] has strongly argued that the inclusion
of broader diplomatic, foreign policy and economic
parameters in the evaluation, design and delivery of
global health programmes can help establish standards
and protocols through which primary health goals as
well as collateral non-health diplomatic and security
goals can be realised in a more acceptable and trans-
parent manner.
Conclusions
Pakistan’s polio eradication campaign is facing a
range of challenges due to a poor health infrastruc-
ture, managerial and operational deficits and serious
inequities in immunisation coverage across the coun-
try. Conflict and insecurity have been particularly
damaging to polio eradication efforts in recent years,
especially in FATA and KP, the main reservoirs of
wild poliovirus in the country. Operation Zarb-e-Azb,
a military offensive launched in 2014 against militants
in FATA, has re-established access to vaccination
teams and enabled more intensive SIAs, translating to
a significant reduction in reported cases of poliomyel-
itis in 2015. Pakistan’s polio eradication effort can
capitalize on these gains by addressing the gross in-
equities in its strategy and infrastructure, help shift
perceptions against vaccination through more con-
certed community engagement and education initia-
tives, and address vaccine hesitancy using tools such
as mass-media campaigns. Strengthening collabora-
tions with influential religious leaders and organisa-
tions can also help mitigate the religious and political
dimensions of vaccine hesitancy in Pakistan. Address-
ing these social and systemic deficits is critical to
eradicating polio from Pakistan and achieving the
GPEI’s objectives.
Pakistan’s polio eradication campaign provides import-
ant lessons for the delivery of future global health initia-
tives; the role of traditional social and religious norms and
their wider diplomatic, security, economic and social re-
percussions in an era of increasing globalisation should
not be underestimated in achieving global health out-
comes and fostering broader socioeconomic development.
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PANEL: SECURITY, FOREIGN POLICY AND HEALTH
• Global health initiatives and foreign policy have become increasingly
interlinked. The USA, UK and European Union have all incorporated aid
as an instrument of foreign policy, so too have emerging powers such
as China, Brazil and Cuba.
• The alignment of health and foreign policy objectives can produce
good outcomes, as was demonstrated by the US role in reducing
Egyptian child mortality rates, and the international response to the
Ebola crisis.
• Diplomatic approaches have also been effective in resolving complex
social, political and religious concerns related to polio vaccination such
as Northern Nigeria’s polio boycott. Similar approaches can be useful in
combating anti-vaccination propaganda in Pakistan.
• However, using health projects to fulfil narrow security interests can
seriously threaten the credibility of global health initiatives,
compromising the safety of global health workers and undermining
their progress.
• Increased collaboration between foreign policymakers, diplomats and
global health professionals can establish appropriate standards and
protocols to account for socioeconomic, political, foreign policy and
primary health interests when designing global health projects and help
mitigate negative health and security consequences.
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